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Abstract—The rapid growth of content distribution on the
Internet has brought with it proportional increases in the costs of
distributing content. Adding to distribution costs is the fact that
digital content is easily duplicable, and hence can be shared in an
illicit peer-to-peer (P2P) manner that generates no revenue for
the content provider. In this paper, we study whether the content
provider can recover lost revenue through a more innovative
approach to distribution. In particular, we evaluate the benefits
of a hybrid revenue-sharing system that combines a legitimate
P2P swarm and a centralized client-server approach. We show
how the revenue recovered by the content provider using a
server-supported legitimate P2P swarm can exceed that of the
monopolistic scheme by an order of magnitude. Our analytical
results are obtained in a fluid model, and supported by stochastic
simulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE past decade has seen the rapid increase of content dis-tribution using the Internet as the medium of delivery [2].
Users and applications expect a low cost for content, but at the
same time require high levels of quality of service. However,
providing content distribution at a low cost is challenging.
The major costs associated with meeting demand at a good
quality of service are (i) the high cost of hosting services on
the managed infrastructure of CDNs such as Akamai [3], [4],
and (ii) the lost revenue associated with the fact that digital
content is easily duplicable, and hence can be shared in an
illicit peer-to-peer (P2P) manner that generates no revenue for
the content provider. Together, these factors have led content
distributors to search for methods of defraying costs.
One technique that is often suggested for defraying dis-
tribution costs is to use legal peer-to-peer (P2P) networks to
supplement provider distribution [5]–[7]. It is well documented
that the efficient use of P2P methods can result in significant
cost reductions from the perspective of ISPs [3], [8]; however
there are substantial drawbacks as well. Probably the most
troublesome is that providers fear losing control of content
ownership, in the sense that they are no longer in control of
the distribution of the content and worry about feeding illegal
P2P activity.
Thus, a key question that must be answered before we can
expect mainstream utilization of P2P approaches is: How can
users that have obtained content legally be encouraged to
reshare it legally? Said in a different way, can mechanisms
be designed that ensure legitimate P2P swarms will dominate
the illicit P2P swarms?
Preliminary results were presented at Allerton, 2012 [1].
In this paper, we investigate a “revenue sharing” approach
to this issue. We suggest that users can be motivated to reshare
the content legally by allowing them to share the revenue
associated with future sales. This can be accomplished through
either a lottery scheme or by simply sharing a fraction of
the sale price. Recent work on using lotteries to promote
societally beneficial conduct [9] suggests that such schemes
could potentially see wide spread adoption.
Such an approach has two key benefits: First, obviously,
this mechanism ensures that users are incentivized to join the
legitimate P2P network since they can profit from joining.
Second, less obviously, this approach actually damages the
illicit P2P network. Specifically, despite the fact that content
is free in the illicit P2P network, since most users expect a
reasonable quality of service, if the delay in the illegitimate
swarm is large they may be willing to use the legitimate
P2P network instead. Thus, by encouraging users to reshare
legitimately, we are averting them from joining the illicit P2P
network, reducing its capacity and performance; thus making
it less likely for others to use it.
The natural concern about a revenue sharing approach is that
by sharing profits with users, the provider is losing revenue.
However, the key insight provided by the results in this paper
is that by discouraging users from joining illicit P2P network,
the increased share (possibly exponentially more) of legitimate
copies makes up for the cost of sharing revenue with end-users.
More specifically, the contribution of this paper is to develop
and analyze a model to explore the revenue sharing approach
described above. Our model (see Section II) is a fluid model
that builds on work studying the capacity of P2P content
distribution systems. The key novel component of the model
is the competition for users among an illicit P2P system
and a legal content distribution network (CDN), which may
make use of a supplementary P2P network with revenue
sharing. The main results of the paper (see Section III) are
Theorems 1-4, which highlight the order-of-magnitude gains
in revenue extracted by the provider as a result of participating
in revenue sharing. Further, In addition to the analytic results,
to validate the insights provided by our asymptotic analysis
of the fluid model we also perform numerical experiments
of the underlying finite stochastic model. Tables I and II
summarize these experiments, which highlight both that the
results obtained in the fluid model are quite predictive for the
finite setting and that there are significant beneficial effects of
revenue sharing.
There is a significant body of prior work modeling and
2analyzing P2P systems. Perhaps the most related work from
this literature is the work that focuses on server-assisted P2P
content distribution networks [10]–[15] in which a central
server is used to “boost” P2P systems. This boost is important
since pure P2P systems suffer poor performance during initial
stages of content distribution. In fact, it is this initially poor
performance that our revenue sharing mechanism exploits to
ensure that the legitimate P2P network dominates.
Two key differentiating factors of the current work com-
pared to this work are: (i) We model the impact of competition
between legal and illegal swarms on the revenue extraction of
a content provider. (ii) Unlike most previous works on P2P
systems, we consider a time varying viral demand model for
the evolution of demand in a piece of content based on the
Bass diffusion model (see Section II). Thus, we model the fact
that interest in content grows as interested users contact others
and make them interested.
With respect to (i), there has been prior work that focuses
on identifying the relative value of content and resources for
different users [16], [17]. For instance, [16] deals with creating
a content exchange that goes beyond traditional P2P barter
schemes, while [17] attempts to characterize the relative value
of peers in terms of their impact on system performance as a
function of time. However, to the best of our knowledge, ours
is the first work that considers the question of economics and
incentives in hybrid P2P content distribution networks.
With respect to (ii), there has been prior work that considers
fluid models of P2P systems such as [18]–[20]. However, these
all focus on the performance evaluation of a P2P system with
constant demand rate. As mentioned above, a unique facet
of our approach is that we explicitly make use the transient
nature of demand in our modeling. In the sense of explicitly
accounting for transient demand, the closest work to ours is
[14]. However, [14] focuses only on jointly optimizing server
and P2P usage in the case of transient demand in order to
obtain a target delay guarantee at the lowest possible server
cost.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We
first introduce the details of our model in Section II. Then,
Section III summarizes analytic and numeric results, the proofs
of which are included in the appendix. Finally, Section V
provides concluding remarks.
II. MODEL OVERVIEW
Our goal is to model the competition between illicit peer-
to-peer (P2P) distribution and a legitimate content distribution
network (CDN), which may make use of its own P2P net-
work. Our model is a fluid model, and there are four main
components:
1) The evolution of the demand for content. A key feature
of this paper is that we consider a realistic model for
the evolution of demand, specifically, the Bass diffusion
model.
2) The model of user behavior, which allows the user to
strategically choose between attaining content legally or
illegally based on the price and performance of the two
options.
3) The model of the illicit P2P system.
4) The model of the legal CDN and its possibility to use
“revenue sharing”.
We discuss these each in turn in the following.
A. The evolution of demand
The simplest possible model of demand is that the entire
population gets interested in the content simultaneously at
time t = 0. We call this the “Flash crowd model” due
to the instantaneous appearance of all the demand. While
the model is simplistic, it can serve as a foundation for
developing performance results, and we will utilize it as our
base case. More complex models of demand can be considered
as well. Indeed, models of the dynamics of demand growth for
innovations dates to the work of Griliches [21] and Bass [22].
The most widely used model for dynamics of demand growth
is the Bass diffusion model which describes how new products
get adopted as potential users interact with users that have
already adopted the product. Such word of mouth interaction
between users and potential users is very common in the
Internet and we use a version of Bass diffusion model that
only has word of mouth spreading. We describe both models
formally below.
We define N to be the total size of the population and I(t)
to be the number of users that are interested in the content at
time t. In the Flash Crowd Model,
I(t) = N, (1)
since all users are interested from the very beginning. In the
Bass diffusion model, each interested user “attempts” to cause
a randomly selected user to become interested in the content.1
At any time t, there are N − I(t) users that could potentially
be interested in the content. Thus, the probability of finding
such a users is (N − I(t))/N . Assuming that an interested
user can interact with other users at rate 1 per unit time, we
get that the rate at which interested users increase is given by
the following differential equation:
dI(t)
dt
=
(
N − I(t)
N
)
I(t). (2)
The above differential equation can be easily solved and yields
the so-called logistic function as its solution.
I(t) =
I(0)et
1− (1− et) I(0)N
, (3)
where I(0) is the number of user that are interested in the
content at time t = 0.
Though the Bass model is quite simple, it is a useful
qualitative summary of the spread of content. To highlight
this, Figure 1 (taken from [14]) highlights a similar behavior
in a data trace from CoralCDN [23], a CDN hosted at different
university sites. The figure shows the cumulative demand for
a home video of the Asian Tsunami seen over a month in
December 2005. For comparision, the figure on the right shows
1Note that these “attempts” should not be interpreted literally, but rather as
the natural diffusion of interest in the new content through the population.
30 5 10 15 20 25
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
Day
Cu
m
ul
at
ive
 V
ie
ws
(a) Single-file cumulative
demand
0 5 10 15 20 25
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
Day
 
 
(b) Cumulative demand in Bass
model
Fig. 1. (a) shows the cumulative demand for a file over one month on Coral
CDN (Dec 2005–Jan 2006). (b) shows the cumulative demand seen in a Bass
diffusion.
the model in equation (3). The qualitative usefulness of the
Bass model has been verified empirically in many settings,
and hence the Bass model is often considered as canonical
[24].
B. The progression of a user
In order to capture the strategic behavior of users in the face
of competition between a legitimate CDN using P2P and an
illicit P2P network our model is necessarily complex. Figure 2
provides a broad overview of the user behavior in the system,
which we explain in detail in the following.
Let us explain the model through tracking the progression
of a user. We term an initial user that wants, but has not yet
attained, the content a Wanter (W). When a Wanter arrives
to the system, it has two options: get content from the illicit
P2P system for free or get content from the legitimate system
for a price p. We assume that the Wanter wishes to obtain
content as quickly and cheaply as possible, and so she first
approaches the illicit P2P swarm and then only attains the
content from the legitimate system if the content is not attained
a reasonable time interval (one infinitesimal clock tick in our
model) from the illicit P2P. This cycle repeats, if necessary,
until the content is attained. In some sense, this is the worst-
case for the legitimate provider since the illicit source is tried
first.
Once the Wanter has attained the content (legally or il-
legally), it could stay in the system and assist in content
dissemination. We denote the probability of this event by
κ < 1. Otherwise, it could simply Quit (Q) and leave the
system with probability 1 − κ. Now, if a Wanter obtains the
content legally and decides to assist in dissemination, it has
two options: (i) It might decide to use the content to assist the
illicit P2P swarm, i.e., go Rogue (R). We denote the probability
this happens by ρ < 1. (ii) It might decide to assist the
legitimate P2P swarm (if one exists) as a Booster (B). We
denote the probability of this event by β < 1. Note that β = 0
if no legal P2P is used. Clearly ρ + β = κ. However, if a
Wanter obtains content illegally and chooses to stay in the
system, it can only aid the illicit swarm as a Fraudster (F).
The probability of this event is simply κ.
Note that the goal of revenue sharing is to incentivize
Wanters to become Boosters after attaining content legally,
rather than going Rogue. The hope is that the revenue invested
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Fig. 2. An overview of the progression of a user through the systems. The
labels are defined as follows: W - Wanter, F - Fraudster, R - Rogue, B -
Booster, and Q - Quit.
toward reducing the number of “early adopters” that go Rogue
keeps the illicit P2P swarm from growing enough to provide
good enough quality of service to dominate the legitimate
swarm.
To model this system more formally, we introduce the
following notation. Let Nw(t) be the number of Wanters at
time t, i.e., the number of users who have not yet attained
the content, and assume Nw(0) = 0. Further, let Nl(t) and
Ni(t) be the number of users with legal and illegal copies of
the content at time t. Note that the total number of interested
users at any time t satisfies the following equation
I(t) = Nw(t) +Nl(t) +Ni(t) (4)
We can break this down further by noting that the number
of Rogues, Fraudsters, and Boosters in the system at time t
(denoted by Nr(t), Nf (t), and Nb(t) respectively) is:
Nr(t) = ρNl(t) (5)
Nf (t) = κNi(t) (6)
Nb(t) = βNl(t), (7)
with ρ + β < 1. The rest of legal and illegal users leave the
system.
The key remaining piece of the model is to formally define
the transition of Wanters to holders of illegal/legal content,
i.e., the evolution of Ni(t) and Nl(t). However, this evolution
depends critically on the model of the two systems, and so we
describe it in the next section.
C. System models
We discuss in detail the illicit and legitimate system models
below. The factors in these models are key determinants of
the choice of a Wanter to get the content legally or illegally.
When modeling the two systems, we consider a fluid model,
and so the performance is determined primarily by the capacity
of each system, i.e., the combination of the initial seeds and
the Fraudsters/Boosters that choose to join (and add capacity).
However, other factors also play a role, as we describe below.
Throughout, we model the upload capacity of a user as being
one.
41) The illicit P2P system: There are two components to
the model of the illicit P2P network: (i) the efficiency of the
network in terms of finding content, and (ii) the initial size of
the network and its growth.
Let us start with (i). To capture the efficiency of the P2P
system, we take a simple qualitative model. When attaining
the content illegally, a Wanter must contact either a Rogue
or a Fraudster. We let η(t) capture the probability of a
Wanter finding a Rogue or a Fraudster when looking for one
instantaneous time slot. We consider two cases: an efficient
P2P and an inefficient P2P. In an efficient P2P, we model
η(t) = 1,
with the understanding the the P2P allows easy lookup of
content and all content is truthfully represented. In contrast,
for an inefficient P2P, we model
η(t) = (Nr(t) +Nf (t))/N,
where recall that N is the total population size. This corre-
sponds to looking randomly within the user population for
a Rogue or Fraudster. Neither of these models is completely
realistic, but they provide lower and upper bounds to the true
efficiency of an illicit P2P system.
Next, with respect to (ii), we model the initial condition for
the illicit network with Ni(0) = 0, since the assumption is that
the content has not yet been released, and therefore is not yet
available in the illicit P2P swarm. From this initial condition,
Ni(0) evolves as follows:
dNi(t)
dt
= min
{
η(t)
(
Nw(t) +
dI(t)
dt
)
, Nr(t) +Nf (t)
}
,
(8)
The interpretation of the above is that Nr(t) + Nf (t) is the
current capacity of the illicit P2P and η(t)
(
Nw(t) +
dI(t)
dt
)
is the fraction of the Wanters (newly arriving and remaining
in the system) that find the content in the illicit P2P network.
The min operator then ensures that no more than the capacity
is used.
2) The legitimate CDN: As discussed in the introduction,
our goal in this work is to contrast the revenue attained by a
CDN that uses P2P and revenue sharing with one that does
not use P2P. Thus, there are two key factors in modeling
the legitimate CDN: (i) the rate at which users that possess
content copies become fraudsters or boosters, and (ii) the
initial size of the CDN and its growth, which depends on the
presence/absence of the legal P2P.
Let us start with (i). From a performance standpoint, the
most important parameter is κ, since it determines what
fraction of users stay in the system and act as servers. These
users could either support the legal system as boosters, or the
illegal one as fraudsters. The question that we wish to answer
is that of how much of an impact the division of those who stay
into fraudsters and boosters would have on revenue obtained.
As we saw earlier,
ρ+ β = κ,
and our key result will be on their relative impact on obtainable
revenue. How we might attempt to control the booster factor β
through different amounts of revenue sharing requires further
modeling of user motivation, which we will consider in greater
detail in Section IV. But initially we are more concerned with
the impact of ρ and β, rather than how to socially engineer
their values.
Next, with respect to (ii), unlike for the illicit P2P swarm,
the legitimate network does not start empty. This is because
it has a set of dedicated servers at the beginning which are
then (possibly) supplemented using a P2P network. We denote
by CN be the capacity of the dedicated CDN servers when
the total population size is N . Note that this capacity must
scale with the total population size to ensure that the average
wait time for the users is small. As shown in [14], a natural
scaling that ensures no more that O(ln lnN) delay is to have
the capacity CN = Θ(N/ lnN). Based on this, we adopt
CN =
N
lnN
in this work. Additionally, we assume Nl(0) = 0, in the case
of Flash Crowd model and Nl(0) = I(0) in the case of Bass
model.
Given these initial conditions, Nl(t) evolves as follows:
dNl(t)
dt
=
{
CN + βNl(t), Nw(t) > 0,
min
{
CN + βNl(t),
dI(t)
dt −
dNi(t)
dt
}
Nw(t) = 0.
(9)
The interpretation for the above is that if there are a positive
number of Wanters remaining in the system, then the full
current capacity of the CDN can be used to serve them,
i.e., CN + βNl(t). However, if there are no “leftover” Wan-
ters, arriving Wanters that are not served by the illicit P2P
(dI(t)dt − dNi(t)dt ) are served up to the capacity of the CDN.
III. RESULTS
To characterize the performance of the CDN against the
illicit P2P distribution, we use fractional legitimate copies,
which is defined as follows:
Definition 1. The fractional legitimate copies, L, is defined
as
L =
Nl(T∞)
N
, (10)
where T∞ is defined as the time after which only Ω(lnN)
users are left in the system without a copy of the content
Using this metric, we look at the performance of the CDN in
two settings: when the CDN competes against inefficient illicit
P2P sharing and when it competes against efficient illicit P2P
sharing. Recall, that our models for these two cases are meant
to serve as upper and lower bounds on the true efficiency
of an illicit P2P system. We start by considering the case
of an inefficient, illicit P2P. Note that the theorems stated
below characterize only the asymptotic growth of the fractional
legitimate copies. However, the proofs of these theorems,
presented in Appendices A-D, actually characterize the exact
growth.
5A. Inefficient illicit P2P
As discussed before, we look at the performance of CDN,
under two simple models of demand evolutions, namely Flash
Crowd Model (1) and Bass model (3).
First, we state the result for Flash Crowd model.
Theorem 1. Suppose I(t) satisfies (1). The fractional legiti-
mate copies attained by the content provider in the presence
an inefficient, illicit P2P is
L ∈ Ω
(
ln lnN + (lnN)
β
κ
lnN
)
. (11)
Further, when β = 0,
L ∈ Θ
(
ln lnN
lnN
)
. (12)
The interpretation of this theorem is striking. When booster
factor, β, is zero, the fractional legitimate copies is expo-
nentially small, Θ
(
ln lnN
lnN
)
. However, as β increases, the
fractional legitimate copies grows by orders of magnitude.
Now, we consider the second model for demand evolution,
Bass model. For analytic reasons, we are not able to work
with the exact Bass model. Thus, we approximate the logistic
curve, (3), as follows:
I(t) =


NI(0)et
N−I(0)+I(0)et 0 ≤ t ≤ T1 : Phase 1
I2 = N/ lnN T1 < t ≤ T2 : Phase 2
I3 =
N
2 T2 < t ≤ T3 : Phase 3
I4 = N T3 < t < T4 : Phase 4,
(13)
where we have T1 = ln(N/(I(0) lnN)), T2 = ln(N/I(0)),
T3 = 2 ln(N/I(0)) and T4 = 3 ln(N/I(0)).2 Notice that the
first stage is the exact Bass diffusion, while the other stages are
order sense approximations of the actual expression. Though
this model is approximate, it yields the same qualitative insight
as the original model. Now, we are ready to state the result.
Theorem 2. Suppose I(t) satisfies (13). The fractional legit-
imate copies attained by the content provider in the presence
an inefficient, illicit P2P is
L ∈ Ω
(
ln lnN + (lnN)
β
κ
lnN
)
(14)
Further, when β = 0,
L ∈ Θ
(
ln lnN
lnN
)
. (15)
Note that the results of the above theorem match with that
of Theorem 1. That means, the fractional legitimate copies
attained by the CDN under Bass model of evolution is no
different from that of Flash Crowd model in asymptotic sense.
Next, let us consider the case of an efficient, illicit P2P
system.
2Note that the value of T1 has been chosen such that limN→∞ I(T1) =
N/ lnN.
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(b) κ = 0.75, β = 0.52
Fig. 3. Evolution of usage in the presence of inefficient illicit P2P sharing.
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Fig. 4. Evolution of usage in the presence of efficient illicit P2P sharing.
B. Efficient illicit P2P
As before, we first consider the case of Flash Crowd model.
Theorem 3. Suppose I(t) satisfies (1). Let κ ∈ (0, 1 −
I(0)/N). The fractional legitimate copies attained by the
content provider in the presence an efficient, illicit P2P is
L ∈ Ω

 1
lnN
(lnN)
β
κ − 1(
β
κ
)

 . (16)
Further, when β = 0,
L ∈ Θ
(
ln lnN
lnN
)
. (17)
Again, the fractional legitimate copies rises by an order of
magnitude as the booster factor, β, increases. Interestingly, the
efficiency of the illicit P2P does not impact the asymptotic
order of the fractional revenue when β = 0, since in both
the efficient and inefficient case it is Θ
(
ln lnN
lnN
)
. However,
the efficiency of the illicit P2P does affect the fractional
legitimate copies attained for positive values of booster factor.
In particular, it causes a (1− βκ ) factor change in the fractional
legitimate copies attained; however this has almost no effect
on the asymptotic growth.
Now, we consider the second case, Bass model of evolution.
Theorem 4. Suppose I(t) satisfies (3). Let κ ∈ (0, 1 −
I(0)/N). The fractional legitimate copies attained by the
content provider in the presence an efficient, illicit P2P is
L ∈ Ω

 1
lnN
(lnN)
β
κ − 1(
β
κ
)

 . (18)
Further, when β = 0,
L ∈ Θ
(
ln lnN
lnN
)
. (19)
6The above theorem along with Theorem 3 asserts that the
fractional legitimate copies attained by the CDN under Bass
model of evolution is no different from that of Flash Crowd
model in asymptotic order.
Since Theorems 1 and 3 rely on a fluid model, and char-
acterize only the asymptotic growth rate of the fractional
legitimate copies produced in the system, we present numerical
simulations to verify the qualitative insights in discrete systems
with finite N .
To simulate the underlying discrete stochastic system, we
assume time is discrete and that there are N = 100, 000
users in the system. A Bass model based interest evolution
is assumed. That means, at each time slot, each user picks a
Poisson distributed number (with mean 1) of other users to
spread interest to. The server has a FIFO policy with service
rate C = 8000 ≈ N/ lnN .
Figure 3 illustrates the evolution of legal and illegal copies
of the content in the case of an inefficient illicit P2P system
with κ = 0.75. In Figure 3(a), where β = 0, the final number
of legal copies produced in the system is 63, 000. When the
booster factor increases, as shown in Figure 3(b) where β =
0.52, the number of legal copies increases to 88, 888; In fact,
the fractional legitimate copies increases by more than 25%.
TABLE I
FRACTIONAL REVENUE RATIO - INEFFICIENT ILLICIT P2P. (*)
SIMULATION RESULTS. (**) ANALYTICAL RESULTS
β
κ
κ = 0.75 κ = 0.5
SIM* ANL** SIM ANL
0 0.64 0.60 0.69 0.67
0.10 0.71 0.71 0.77 0.75
0.24 0.77 0.72 0.82 0.77
0.41 0.81 0.75 0.86 0.79
0.63 0.87 0.79 0.92 0.80
0.92 0.97 0.85 0.98 0.82
In Table I, we compare the simulation results (SIM column
entries in Table I ) against our analytical results (ANL column
entries in Table I) from Lemma 9 and Corollary 10, for various
combinations of κ and β. As expected from Corollary 10, our
analytical predictions closely match with the simulation results
in the case, β = 0. In the case, β > 0, the predicted values are
less than those obtained using simulation, which agrees with
Lemma 9; nevertheless, the differences are quite small. Also
observe that, as β increases, the fractional legitimate copies
improves significantly. Especially, in the case, κ = 0.75, as
booster factor increases from β = 0 to β = 0.92κ, the
fractional legitimate copies increases by 150%.
Next, we move to the case of an efficient illicit P2P. Figure 4
illustrates the case of an efficient illicit P2P system. In Figure
4(a), where β = 0, the final number of legal copies produced
in the system is 45, 920. When the booster factor increases,
as shown in Figure 4(b) where β = 0.38, the number of legal
copies increases to 96, 380; In fact, the fractional legitimate
copies increases by more than 100%.
In Table II, we tabulate the simulation results and the
analytical results. The analytical results are obtained from
Lemma 13 and Lemma 14. The simulation results are in
agreement with our analytical predictions. Also note that, the
improvement attained in the fractional legitimate copies, as β
TABLE II
FRACTIONAL REVENUE RATIO - EFFICIENT ILLICIT P2P. (*) SIMULATION
RESULTS. (**) ANALYTICAL RESULTS
β
κ
κ = 0.75 κ = 0.5 κ = 0.25
SIM* ANL** SIM ANL SIM ANL
0 0.03 0.03 0.15 0.15 0.42 0.37
0.48 0.07 0.07 0.28 0.26 0.56 0.50
0.69 0.18 0.14 0.40 0.38 0.67 0.59
0.84 0.30 0.24 0.54 0.52 0.77 0.68
0.95 0.55 0.41 0.78 0.69 0.9 0.78
increase, is phenomenal. For example, in the case, κ = 0.75,
as booster factor increases from β = 0 to β = 0.95κ, the
fractional legitimate copies increases by 1833%.
IV. REVENUE SHARING MODEL
In the previous sections, we studied the impact of the three
parameters ρ, β and κ on the eventual number of legal content
copies in the system. We made the assumption that ρ+β = κ,
following the intuition that κ is the fixed probability of a user
who has the content being willing to redistribute it, and which
P2P swarm is joined affects the number of legal copies. We
now consider the motivation behind the users’ decisions on
which swarm to join.
Suppose that the purchase price of a copy of the content
is p. Hence, a user that wishes to obtain a legal copy of the
content must pay the content generator the sum p through
some kind of online banking system. Suppose that the content
owner utilizes a simple model for revenue sharing, where
a user receives ǫp for each piece of content it distributes
when taking part in the legitimate network as a Booster. Thus,
ǫ = 0 corresponds to no revenue sharing. Note that this could
potentially be implemented on a system such as BitTorrent by
simply keeping track of amount uploaded by each peer3. The
value ǫ can be viewed either as a share of the revenue from
each download or as the expected payoff of a lottery scheme
operated by the CDN.
While it is difficult to exactly predict the effect of revenue
sharing, it seems reasonable that increased revenue sharing
should limit the likelihood of a Wanter going rogue after
attaining the content legally. To qualitatively capture this
effect, we model ρ as a decreasing function of ǫ. A specific
form could be
ρ = κφ(ǫ),
where φ(.) is a decreasing function with φ(0) = 1 and φ(1) =
0.
Recall that we defined the parameter R as the fractional
revenue, also the fraction of legitimate copies in the system
at T∞. It is clear that the profit obtained by the content
owner also depends on the amount of revenue shared with
the boosters, which in turn depends on the exact form of φ(ǫ).
Hence, the content owner would have to determine the optimal
amount of revenue sharing in order to maximize profit. For
illustration, let us choose
φ(ǫ) = N−ǫ,
3BitTorrent Trackers already collect such information in order to gather
performance statistics.
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Fig. 5. Impact of the amount of revenue sharing on the fractional revenue
attained by the CDN.
in our simulations. The results are shown in Figure 5, which
illustrates the impact of the amount of revenue sharing on the
fractional revenue ratio of the CDN in the cases of inefficient
and efficient illicit P2Ps. We use κ = 0.75 in the simulation.
The key point to observe in the figure is that there is a
clear optimal amount of revenue sharing for the provider. In
both cases, this amount is fairly small, however, it is clearly
desirable to share more revenue in the presence of an efficient
illicit P2P than in the presence of an inefficient illicit P2P. In
fact, sharing nearly zero percent of the revenue still provides
fairly close to the optimal fractional revenue in the inefficient
case, while one must share more than 10% of the revenue to
be near-optimal in the case of an efficient, illicit P2P.
V. CONCLUSION
Our goal in this paper is to quantify the ramifications of
coopting legal P2P content sharing, not only as a means of
reducing costs of content distribution, but, more importantly,
as a way of hurting the performance of illegal P2P file sharing.
The model that we propose internalizes the idea that demand
for any content is transient, and that all content will eventually
be available for free through illegal file sharing. The objective
then is not to cling to ownership rights, but to extract as much
revenue from legal copies as possible within the available
time. We develop a revenue sharing scheme that recognizes
the importance of early adopters in extending the duration of
time that revenue may be extracted. In particular, keeping users
from “going rogue” (becoming seeds in illegal networks) by
allowing them to extract some revenue for themselves (and
so defray part of their expense in purchasing the content in
the first place), provides order sense improvements in the
extractable revenue. We realize that our paradigm is contrary to
the “conventional wisdom” of charging more rather than less to
early adopters, and also to discourage file sharing using legal
threats. However, as many recent studies have demonstrated,
incentives work better than threats in human society, and
adoption of our revenue sharing approach might result in a
cooperative equilibrium between content owners, distributors
and end-users. Future work includes a characterization of the
exact value of users based on their times of joining the system,
as well as considering content streaming, which requires strict
quality of service guarantees.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
To prove Theorem 1, we analyze two processes N¯l(t) and
N¯i(t) which bounds the actual evolutions Nl(t) and Ni(t).
Importantly, the bounding processes are equivalent to the
original processes when β = 0.
8Before stating the results, we introduce a few notation. Let
θ1 =
κ
2
+
κ
2
√
1 +
4
κ lnN
, θ2 =
κ
2
−
κ
2
√
1 +
4
κ lnN
,
b = −
θ1
θ2
, ∆θ = θ1 − θ2, (20)
τ¯ =
2
∆θ
ln


√
1 + 4κ lnN + 1√
1 + 4κ lnN − 1

 , (21)
N¯l =
κCN
βθ1
(
1
1 + b
) β
κ (
1− e(−
βθ1 τ¯
2κ )
)
e(
βθ1
κ
τ¯)
−
κCN
βθ2
(
1
1 + b
) β
κ
e(
τ¯β
2 )
(
1− e
βθ2τ¯
2κ
)
. (22)
Finally, we are ready to define the bounding processes
used in the proof, N¯l(t) and N¯i(t). Let N¯i(0) = Ni(0).
Furthermore, let
dN¯i(t)
dt
=
ρN¯l(t) + κN¯i(t)
N
(N − (N¯l(t) + N¯i(t))). (23)
Similarly, let N¯l(0) = Nl(0) and
dN¯l(t)
dt
=
{
CN + βN¯l(t)
N−(N¯l(t)+N¯i(t))
N , N¯w(t) > 0,
0, N¯w(t) = 0.
(24)
where N¯w(t) = N − (N¯i(t) + N¯l(t)).
We can now state our result characterizing the number of
legal and illegal copies.
Lemma 5. In the presence of an inefficient, illicit P2P, the
number of illegal and legal copies at the end of evolution is
Nl(T∞) ≥ N¯l,
where equality holds when β = 0.
Proof: Recall that the efficiency factor of an inefficient
illicit P2P, η(t), is given by
η(t) =
Nr(t) +Nf(t)
N
=
ρNl(t) + κNi(t)
N
. (25)
The second equality follows from (5) and (6). From (8), the
illegal growth rate is
dNi(t)
dt
(a)
= η(t)Nw(t) (26)
(b)
= (ρNl(t)+κNi(t))(N−(Nl(t)+Ni(t)))N . (27)
(a) follows from the definition of η(t) and the fact that
Nw(t) ≤ N . (b) follows from (25) and (4). From equation (9),
the growth rate of legal copies is given by
dNl(t)
dt
=
{
CN + βNl(t), Nw(t) > 0,
0, Nw(t) = 0.
(28)
Let U(t) be the total copies of the content in the system. Then,
U(t) = Nl(t) +Ni(t).
Now, we claim that,
Nl(T∞) ≥ N¯l(T∞), (29)
and the equality holds when β = 0.
The proof is as follows: First, we define, U¯(t) = N¯l(t) +
N¯i(t). We can obtain dNidU and
dN¯i
dU¯
from the pair of equations
(26), (28) and (23), (24) respectively. Then, it can be shown
that
dNi
dU
|Ni=x,U=y ≤
dN¯i
dU¯
|N¯i=x,U¯=y, (30)
and the equality holds when β = 0. Note that the range space
of functions U(t) and U¯(t) are identical. Since, the initial
values Ni(0) and N¯i(0) are equal by definition, we get the
result in (29).
Now, we derive N¯l(t). Let τ¯ be the time at which the
number of wanters in the system vanishes to zero. Then,
N¯w(t) = 0 and U¯(t) = N for t ∈ [τ¯ , T∞]. Adding (24)
and (23), for t ∈ (0, τ¯ ], we get,
dU¯
dt
=
(
(β + ρ)N¯l(t) + κN¯i(t)
) (N − (N¯l(t) + N¯i(t)))
N
(f)
= κU¯(t)
N − U¯(t)
N
.
(f) follows from the fact that ρ+ β = κ and the definition of
U¯(t).
The above differential equation is in the form of a standard
Riccatti equation, and it’s solution can be written as
U¯(t) =
Nθ2
κ
+
N∆θ/κ
1 + be−∆θt
, (31)
where ∆θ = θ1− θ2. θ1, θ2 and b are given by equation (20).
From the relation, U¯(τ¯ ) = N , we get (21).
Now, from (24), for t ∈ (0, τ¯ ], we get
dN¯l(t)
dt
= CN + βN¯l(t)
N − (N¯l(t) + N¯i(t))
N
.
A lower bound on the solution of the above differential
equation is provided by Lemma 16 in Appendix E. From the
defintions of b and τ¯ , given by (20) and (21), it is clear that
b > 1 and τ¯ > ln b/∆θ. Then, by evaluating (147) at t = τ¯
with N¯l(0) = I(0), we get N¯l in (22). Also, when β = 0,
the lemma yields an exact solution of the above differential
equation. Hence proved.
As mentioned in the statement of Lemma 5, the inequality
is exact in the case of β = 0. Additionally, in this case, the
form of Nl(T∞) simplifies.
Corollary 6. Let β = 0. In the presence of an inefficient,
illicit P2P, the number of illegal and legal copies is given by
Nl(T∞) =
2CN
∆θ
ln


√
1 + 4κ lnN + 1√
1 + 4κ lnN − 1

 . (32)
Now that we have characterized the number of legal and
illegal copies precisely, attaining the statement in Theorem 1
is accomplished by studying the asymptotics of the results in
Lemma 5 and Corollary 6.
To begin, recall from (10) that,
L =
Nl(T∞)
N
≥
N¯l
N
, (33)
9where N¯l is defined by (22). Following a few algebraic steps,
from the above equation, we get that
L ∈ Ω
(
ln lnN + (lnN)
β
κ
lnN
)
(34)
and L ∈ Θ
(
ln lnN
lnN
)
if β = 0, which completes the proof of
Theorem 1.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
To prove Theorem 2, we will go through a sequence of
intermediate results characterizing the number of legal/illegal
copies at the transition points of the approximate Bass model.
We start by characterizing the number of legal and illegal
copies at the end of Phase 1.
Lemma 7. In the presence of an inefficient, illicit P2P, the
number of illegal and legal copies at the end of Phase 1 of
the approximate Bass model are given by
Ni(T1) =
(
ρI(0)
κ− ρ
+
Nρ
(κ− ρ)2
)
exp (BN )
−
I(T1)ρ
κ− ρ
−
Nρ
(κ− ρ)2
(35)
Nl(T1) = I(T1)−Ni(T1), (36)
where
I(T1) =
N
lnN
N
N − I(0) + (N/ lnN)
BN =
(
(κ− ρ)
N
(I(T1)− I(0))
)
.
Note that in the above, we have allowed κ, ρ, and β to be
arbitrary. In fact, in this case, β is inconsequential since the
full amount of interested copies can be served by the dedicated
capacity of the CDN. Note that in the case when ρ = κ, things
simplify considerably.
Corollary 8. Let ρ = κ. In the presence of an inefficient,
illicit P2P, the number of illegal and legal copies at the end
of Phase 1 of the approximate Bass model are given by
Ni(T1) =
κ(I2(T1)− I
2(0))
2N
Nl(T1) = I(T1)−Ni(T1),
where I(T1) = NlnN
N
N−I(0)+(N/ lnN) .
We now prove the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 7: From equation (13), the population
of interested copies in phase I is given by
I(t) =
NI(0)et
N − I(0) + I(0)et
. (37)
From the above equation, it is easy to verify that the rate of
growth of interested copies is less than the server capacity
CN , i.e., dI(t)/dt ≤ CN . Thus, any interested user is served
instantaneously either by a legal or illegal mechanism. Hence,
the number of Wanters in the system is zero, i.e, Nw(t) = 0.
Therefore, it follows from equation (4) that Nl(t) +Ni(t) =
I(t).
Next, from equation (8), we get that
dNi(t)
dt
= min
{
η(t)
dI(t)
dt
,Nr(t) +Nf (t)
}
(a)
= η(t)
dI(t)
dt
, (38)
where the equality (a) follows from the definition of η(t) and
the fact that dI(t)/dt ≤ CN < N .
Because we are considering an inefficient P2P, we have
η(t) =
Nr(t) +Nf (t)
N
,
(b)
=
ρNl(t) + κNi(t)
N
,
(c)
=
ρ(I(t)−Ni(t))
N
+
κNi(t)
N
,
=
ρI(t)
N
+
(κ− ρ)Ni(t)
N
.
where equality (b) follows from (5), (6) and the equality (c)
follows from the fact that Nl(t) = I(t) −Ni(t). Substituting
the above result in equation (38), we get
dNi(t)
dt
=
dI(t)
dt
ρI(t)
N
+
dI(t)
dt
(κ− ρ)Ni(t)
N
.
The solution of the above differential equation is given by
Ni(t) = K exp
(
I(t)(κ− ρ)
N
)
−
ρI(t)
κ− ρ
−
Nρ
(κ− ρ)2
,
where the constant K can be obtained from the fact that
Ni(0) = 0. Thus, the evolution of illegal copies is given by
Ni(t) =
(
ρI(0)
κ− ρ
+
Nρ
(κ− ρ)2
)
exp
(
(κ− ρ)
N
(I(t)− I(0))
)
−
ρI(t)
κ− ρ
−
Nρ
(κ− ρ)2
.
The number of illegal copies at the end of Phase 1 can be
obtained by evaluating the above expression at t = T1. The
remaining population get the content legally, i.e, Nl(T1) =
I(T1)−Ni(T1).
Now that we have characterized the number of legal and
illegal copies at the end of Phase 1, we can move to Phases
2-4. Unfortunately, the resulting number of legal and illegal
copies at the end of these phases is much more complicated.
However, much of this complicated form is only necessary
to specify the exact analytic values. Once we focus on the
asymptotic form (as in Theorem 1), it simplifies considerably.
Before stating the result, we need to introduce a consid-
erable amount of notation. This notation stems from the fact
that we do not analyze the exact process of Nl(t) and Ni(t).
Instead, we define a processes N¯l(t) and N¯i(t) which bounds
Nl(t) and Ni(t) and analyze these processes. Importantly, the
bounding processes are equivalent to the original processes
when β = 0, i.e., the case of no revenue sharing. Before
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defining N¯l and N¯i, Let
∆τ¯2 =
1
κ lnNZ1
ln

Z1 + 1− 2I(T1)(N/ lnN)
Z1 − 1 +
2I(T1)
(N/ lnN)


+
1
κ lnNZ1
ln
(
Z1 + 1
Z1 − 1
)
, (39)
∆τ¯3 =
2
κZ2
ln
(
Z2 + 1−
4
lnN
Z2 − 1 +
4
lnN
)
+
2
κZ2
ln
(
Z2 + 1
Z2 − 1
)
, (40)
∆τ¯4 =
1
κZ3
ln
(
Z3 + 1
Z3 − 1
)
, (41)
where Z1 =
√
1 + 4 lnNκ , Z2 =
√
1 + 16κ lnN , Z3 =√
1 + 4κ lnN and I(T1) =
N
lnN
N
N−I(0)+(N/ lnN) . In addition,
let
θj1 = κ
Ij
2N
+
1
2
√(
κIj
N
)2
+
4κ
lnN
, (42)
θj2 = κ
Ij
2N
−
1
2
√(
κIj
N
)2
+
4κ
lnN
, (43)
∆θj = θ
j
1 − θ
j
2 and
bj =
Nθ1,j − κI(Tj−1)
κI(Tj−1)−Nθ2,j
. (44)
Note that, in the above definition, in fact I(Tj−1) = Ij−1 for
j = 3 and 4.
Furthermore, for j = 2, 3 and 4, let
dj = (bj + exp(∆θj∆τ¯j)) (45)
qj1 =
(
βθj2
κ
−
βIj
N
)
(46)
qj2 =
βθj1
κ
−
βIj
N
(47)
Finally, we are ready to define the bounding processes
used in the proof, N¯l(t) and N¯i(t). Let N¯i(T1) = Ni(T1).
Furthermore, during Phase j, let
dN¯i(t)
dt
=
ρN¯l(t) + κN¯i(t)
N
(Ij − (N¯l(t) + N¯i(t))). (48)
Similarly, let N¯l(T1) = Nl(T1) and, during Phase j,
dN¯l(t)
dt
=
{
CN + βN¯l(t)
Ij−(N¯l(t)+N¯i(t))
N , N¯w(t) > 0,
0, N¯w(t) = 0.
(49)
where N¯w(t) = Ij − (N¯i(t) + N¯l(t)). Finally, let
U¯(t) = N¯l(t) + N¯i(t).
To state the result, we use a bit more notation about these
processes. Let N¯1l = Nl(T1) and for j = 2, 3, and 4 define
N¯l(Tj) recursively as follows:
N¯ jl = N¯
j−1
l
(
1 + bj
dj
) β
κ
e(−q
j
1∆τ¯j)+
+ CN
(
bj
dj
) β
κ
e(−q
j
1∆τ¯j)

e
(
qj1
ln bj
∆θj
)
qj1
−
1
qj1

 1b≥1
+ CN
(
1
dj
) β
κ
e(−q
j
1∆τ¯j)

e(q
j
2∆τ¯j)
qj2
−
e
(
q
j
2 ln bj
∆θj
)
1b≥1
qj2


− CN
(
1
dj
) β
κ
e(−q
j
1∆τ¯j) 1
qj2
(1− 1b≥1), (50)
where 1b≥1 is given by
1b≥1 =
{
1 b ≥ 1,
0 b < 1.
(51)
We can now state our result characterizing the number of
legal and illegal copies at the end of Phases 2-4.
Lemma 9. In the presence of an inefficient, illicit P2P, the
number of illegal and legal copies at the end of Phase j,
j ∈ {2, 3, 4} of the approximate Bass model are given by
Nl(Tj) ≥ N¯
j
l ,
where equality holds when β = 0.
From the approximate Bass model (13), the evolution of
demand in Phase j, for j = 2, 3 and 4, is given by,
I(t) = Ij , where t ∈ [Tj−1, Tj).
Note that in these three phases, a change in the number of
interested copies occurs only at the beginning of the phase and
then, it remains constant throughout the phase. That means, the
dynamics of evolutions of Nl(t) and Ni(t) in these phases are
similar to that of Flash Crowd model discussed in Lemma 5.
Also, it can be shown that each of these phases is long enough
so that every interested user appearing at the beginning of a
phase is being served by the end of that phase. Therefore,
we can analyaze each of these phases independently. Now, by
recursively applying the analysis of Lemma 5 for each of the
three phases, we get Lemma 9. A detailed proof of the above
lemma is given below.
Proof: From the approximate Bass model (13), the evo-
lution of demand in Phase j is,
I(t) = Ij , where t ∈ (Tj−1, Tj ],
and the number of Wanters in Phase j is Nw(t) = Ij−(Nl(t)+
Ni(t)).
Recall that the efficiency factor of an inefficient illicit P2P,
η(t), is given by
η(t) =
Nr(t) +Nf (t)
N
=
ρNl(t) + κNi(t)
N
. (52)
The second equality follows from (5) and (6).
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From equation (8), the illegal growth rate in Phase j is
dNi(t)
dt
(a)
= min {η(t)Nw(t), Nr(t) +Nf (t)} ,
(b)
= η(t)Nw(t) (53)
(c)
=
ρNl(t) + κNi(t)
N
(Ij − (Nl(t) +Ni(t))). (54)
Here (a) follows from the fact that I(t) is constant in the last
three phases. (b) follows from the definition of η(t) and the
fact that Nw(t) ≤ N . (c) follows from (52).
From equation (9), the growth rate of legal copies in Phase j
is given by
dNl(t)
dt
=
{
CN + βNl(t), Nw(t) > 0,
0, Nw(t) = 0.
(55)
The second equality follows from the fact that dNidt = 0 when
there are no Wanters in the system (from (53)) and I(t) is
constant.
Let U(t) be the total copies of the content in the system.
Then,
U(t) = Nl(t) +Ni(t).
Note that the growth rate Nl(t) is at least equal to CN when
Nw(t) > 0. In that case, it can be shown that
CN × (Tj − Tj−1) > (I(Tj)− I(Tj−1)).
since I(0) << CN , by assumption. This means that every
interested user generated in any one of the last three phases
can be served within that phase itself. Furthermore, Lemma
7 shows that no Wanters are left unserved after Phase 1.
Therefore, we can conclude that
Nl(Tj) +Ni(Tj) = U(Tj) = I(Tj) = Ij . (56)
The same arguments hold true in the case of N¯l(t), i.e,
N¯l(Tj) + N¯i(Tj) = U¯(Tj) = I(Tj) = Ij . (57)
Now, we claim that,
Nl(Tj) ≥ N¯l(Tj), (58)
and the equality holds when β = 0.
We can derive dNidU and
dN¯i
dU¯
from the pair of equations (53),
(55) and (48), (49) respectively. Then, it can be shown that
dNi
dU
|Ni=x,U=y ≤
dN¯i
dU¯
|N¯i=x,U¯=y, (59)
and the equality holds when β = 0. Note that the range space
of functions U(t) and U¯(t) are identical; in fact they are equal
to [I(Tj−1), I(Tj)] in Phase j which follows from (56) and
(57). Furthermore, recall that the initial values of Ni(T1) and
N¯i(T1) are equal by definition. Hence, the conclusion is
Ni(Tj) ≤ N¯i(Tj).
Then, the claim in (58) is true from the facts that Nl(Tj) =
I(Tj)−Ni(Tj) and N¯l(Tj) = I(Tj)− N¯i(Tj).
Our objective is to derive an expression of N¯l(t). Then,
evaluate the expression at t = Tj in order to obtain a lower
bound on the number of legal copies at the end of each Phase j.
Let τ¯j be the time such that U¯(τ¯j) = Ij . This event happens
within Phase j itself (from (57)). i.e, τ¯j ∈ (Tj−1, Tj ]. In
addition,
N¯w(t) = 0 when t ∈ (τ¯j , Tj].
Adding (49) and (48), for t ∈ (Tj−1, τ¯j ], we get,
dU¯
dt
=
(
(β + ρ)N¯l(t) + κN¯i(t)
) (Ij − (N¯l(t) + N¯i(t)))
N
(e)
=
(
κN¯l(t) + κN¯i(t)
) (Ij − (N¯l(t) + N¯i(t)))
N
(f)
= κU¯(t)
Ij − U¯(t)
N
.
(e) follows from the fact that ρ+ β = κ. (f) follows from the
definition of U¯(t) in Phase j.
The differential equation given above is a standard Riccatti
equation. Its solution is given by
U¯(t) =
Nθ2,j
κ
+
N∆θj/κ
1 + bje−∆θj(t−Tj−1)
, (60)
where ∆θj = θ1,j − θ2,j . θ1,j , θ2,j and bj are given by
equations (42), (43) and (44) respectively.
Let ∆τ¯j = τ¯j − Tj−1. Recall that τ¯j is the solution of the
equation U¯(τ¯j) = Ij . Hence, from the above result, we get,
τ¯j − Tj−1 =
1
∆θj
ln


√
1 + 4κ lnN j + 1−
2I(Tj−1)
I(Tj)√
1 + 4κ lnN j − 1 +
2I(Tj−1)
I(Tj)


+
1
∆θj
ln


√
1 + 4κ lnN j + 1√
1 + 4κ lnN j − 1

 . (61)
The above expression yields (39), (40) and (41) respectively,
when I(Tj) is substituted by actual values from the bass
model.
Now, applying the above expression in (49), for t ∈
(Tj−1, τ¯j ], we get
dN¯l(t)
dt
= CN + βN¯l(t)
Ij − (N¯l(t) + N¯i(t))
N
.
A lower bound on the solution of the above differential
equation is provided by Lemma 16 in Appendix E. It can
be shown that b exp(−∆θj∆τ¯j) << 1. Then τ¯j satisfies the
condition stipulated by that lemma and a lower bound on the
number of legal at the end of Phase j can be obtained by
evaluating (147) at t = τ¯j , which yields N¯ jl in (50). In case
β = 0, (147) is an exact solution of the above differential
equation.
As mentioned in the statement of Lemma 9, the inequality
is exact in the case of β = 0. Additionally, in this case, the
form of Nl(T4) simplifies.
Corollary 10. Let β = 0. In the presence of an inefficient,
illicit P2P, the number of illegal and legal copies at the end
of Phase 4 of the approximate Bass model is given by
Nl(T4) = Nl(T1) + CN
4∑
j=2
∆τ¯j (62)
where Nl(T1) is given by Corollary 8.
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Now that we have characterized the number of legal and
illegal copies at the end of Phase 4 precisely, attaining the
statement in Theorem 1 is accomplished by taking studying
the asymptotics of the results in Lemma 9 and Corollary 10.
Throughout, we use AN ∼ BN to denote limN→∞ ANBN = 1.
To begin, recall from (10) that,
L =
Nl(T∞)
N
=
Nl(T∞)
N
(63)
≥
N¯4l
N
, (64)
where N¯4l is recursively defined by (50) in terms of N¯1l , N¯2l
and N¯3l . As N goes larger, from the above equation, we get
that
L ∈ Ω
(
ln lnN + (lnN)
β
κ
lnN
)
(65)
and L ∈ Θ
(
ln lnN
lnN
)
if β = 0, which completes the proof of
Theorem 1.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
The proof of Theorem 3 parallels to that of Theorem 1.We
mimick the approach of the proof of Theorem 3 and define
two processes N¯l(t) and N¯i(t) that bound Nl(t) and Ni(t) and
analyze these processes. Importantly, the bounding processes
are equivalent to the original processes when β = 0.
Let U¯(t) = N¯l(t) + N¯i(t). Further, let N¯l(0) = Nl(0) = 0
and
dN¯l(t)
dt
= =
{
CN + βN¯l(t) N¯w(t) > 0,
0 N¯w(t) = 0.
(66)
where N¯w(t) = N − U¯(t). Furthermore, we define N¯i(0) =
Ni(0) = 0 and
dN¯i(t)
dt
=
{
ρN¯l(t) + κN¯i(t) 0 ≤ U¯(t) ≤
N
1+ρ ,
N − N¯l(t)− N¯i(t)
N
1+ρ ≤ U¯(t) ≤ N.
(67)
Finally, let N¯i(0) = Ni(0) = 0. To state the results, we may
need a bit more notation. Let
N¯l =
N
lnNβ
(
eβτ¯ − 1
)
. (68)
Furthermore, τ¯ = 11+β ln
(
1 + lnN(1+β)H
−β
κ
1+ρ
)
+ 1κ ln (H) ,
where H = 1 + κ lnN(1+ρ) . Now, we characterize the number of
legal copies and illegal copies in the following lemma.
Lemma 11. In the presence of an efficient, illicit P2P, the
number of illegal copies is given by
Nl(T∞) ≥ N¯l, (69)
and the equality holds when β = 0.
Proof:
From equation (8), the growth rate of illegal copies is given
by
dNi
dt
a
= min {Nw(t), ρNl(t) + κNi(t))} (70)
b
= min{I(t)− U(t), ρNl(t) + κNi(t))} (71)
where (a) follows from equations (5), (6) along with the facts
that η = 1 and I(t) is constant. (b) follows from the definition
of the number of wanters in the system.
From equation (9), the growth rate of legal copies in Phase j
is given by
dNl(t)
dt
c
= CN + βNl(t) if Nw(t) > 0,
d
= 0 if Nw(t) = 0. (72)
(d) follows from the facts that dNidt = 0 when there are no
wanters in the system (from (70)) and I(t) is constant.
As defined before, let U(t) be the total copies of the content
in the system. Then, U(t) = Nl(t) +Ni(t).
Now, we claim that,
Nl(Tj) ≥ N¯l(Tj). (73)
and the equality holds when β = 0.
Note that
dN¯l(t)
dt
|U¯=x,N¯i=y
e
=
dNl(t)
dt
|U=x,Ni=y, (74)
dN¯i(t)
dt
|U¯=x,N¯i=y
f
≥
dNi(t)
dt
|U=x,Ni=y. (75)
and (f) is an equality when β = 0. (e) follows from (66)
and (72). And (f) is due to (70) and (67). From the above
equations, we can deduce that
dN¯l
dU¯
|U¯=x,N¯i=y ≤
dNl
dU
|U=x,Ni=y. (76)
Note that the range of functions U(t) and U¯(t) are identical,
[I(0), N ]. Since Nl(0) = N¯l(0), from the above equation, we
get that Nl(Tj) ≥ N¯i(Tj), Also, equality holds when β = 0.
Let τ¯ be the instant at which N¯w(τ¯ ) = 0. Then, the number
of legal copies, Nl(t), is given by
N¯l(t) =
{ (
CN
β
)
eβt − CNβ t ∈ (0, τ¯ ],
N¯l(τ¯) t > τ¯ .
(77)
The above result follows from (66) and the initial condition
Nl(0) = 0. Now, we resort to find τ¯ . Note that, N¯w(τ¯ ) = 0
implies U¯(τ¯ ) = N . Therefore, first we derive U¯(t) and then,
finds the time at which U¯(t) reaches N .
Note that U¯(0) < N1+ρ , by assumption. Then, from (66) and
(67), we get that
dU¯(t)
dt
= ρU¯(t) + CN , if t ∈ [0, ν],
where ν is defined as U¯(ν) = N1+ρ . Solving the above equation
with the initial condition U¯(0) = 0 yields
U¯(t) =
CN
κ
eκt −
CN
κ
, if t ∈ [0, ν]. (78)
Then, from the above result ν can shown to be ν = 1κ ln(H),
where H = 1 + κ lnN1+ρ .
Now, consider the case t ∈ [ν, τ¯ ]. Then, N1+ρ ≤ U¯(t) ≤ N
and hence, from (67),
dNi
dt
= N − N¯l(t)− N¯i(t), if t ∈ [ν, τ¯ ].
13
Solving the above equation, we get
N¯i(t) = N −
(
N¯l(ν) +
CN
β
)
eβ(t−ν)
1 + β
+
CN
β
+
(
N¯i(ν) +
N¯l(ν)
1 + β
−
CN
1 + β
−N
)
e−(t−ν),
= N −
CN
β
eβ(t)
1 + β
+
CN
β
−
(
Nρ
1 + ρ
+
CNe
βν
1 + β
)
e−(t−ν),
for t ∈ [ν, τ¯ ]. Here, the second equality is obtained by
replacing N¯i(ν) with U¯(ν)− N¯l(ν) and by substituting N¯l(ν)
from (77). Then, U¯(t), which is eqaul to N¯l(t) + N¯i(t), is
given by
U¯(t) = N +
CNe
βt
1 + β
−
(
Nρ
1 + ρ
+
CNe
βν
1 + β
)
e−(t−ν).
Now, solving for t, from U¯(t) = N , we get that
τ¯ = ν +
1
1 + β
ln
(
1 +
lnN(1 + β)e−βν
1 + ρ
)
(79)
=
1
κ
lnH +
1
1 + β
ln
(
1 +
lnN(1 + β)H
−β
κ
1 + ρ
)
. (80)
The second result follows by susbtituting ν = 1κ lnH , where
H = 1 + κ lnN1+ρ .
Finally, substituting τ¯ in (77) yields N¯l, which completes
the proof.
As mentioned in the statement of Lemma 11, the inequality
is exact in the case of β = 0. Additionally, in this case, the
form of Nl(T∞) simplifies.
Corollary 12. Let β = 0. Then, the number of legal copies at
the end of Phase 4 is given by Nl(T∞) = CN τ¯ ,
Now that we have characterized the number of legal and
illegal copies precisely, attaining the statement in Theorem 3
is accomplished by studying the asymptotics of the results in
Lemma 11 and Corollary 12. From (10), Lemma 11, Corollary
12 and equation (68), we can show that
L ∈ Ω

 1
lnN
(lnN)
β
κ − 1(
β
κ
)

 , (81)
and L ∈ Θ
(
ln lnN
lnN
)
if β = 0, which completes the proof.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
In our model, an efficient illicit P2P is characterized by
efficiency parameter, η(t), equal to one. Then, from (8), the
evolution of illegal copies of content in the system, Ni(t), is
given by
dNi(t)
dt
= min
{
Nw(t) +
dI(t)
dt
, ρNl(t) + κNi(t)
}
. (82)
And, the evolution of legal copies of the content in the system,
Ni(t), is given by,
dNl(t)
dt
=
{
CN + βNl(t) Nw(t) > 0,
min{CN + βNl(t),
dI
dt −
dNi
dt } Nw(t) = 0.
(83)
Fig. 6. Evolutionary phases of the growth of Legal and Illegal copies of
content in the presence of an efficient Illicit P2P
As the interest for the content evolves according to the Bass
demand model, the evolution of Nl(t) and Ni(t) traverses
along multiple stages of dynamics as shown in Figure 6.
Below, we discuss these stages of evolution in detail.
Stage 1: By assumption, Nl(0) = I(0), Ni(0) = 0 and
Nw(0) = 0 where I(0) is the initial demand in the system.
Then,
Nw(0) +
dI(t)
dt
|t=0 > ρNl(0) + κNi(0).
The above result follows from our assumption that κ < 1 −
I(0)
N . Therefore, at t = 0, from (82),
dNi(t)
dt
= ρNl(t) + κNi(t). (84)
From (83), the evolution of Nl(t) at time t = 0 is,
dNl(t)
dt
=
dI(t)
dt
−
dNi(t)
dt
, (85)
=
dI(t)
dt
− (ρNl(t) + κNi(t)). (86)
The first equality follows from the facts that Nw(0) = 0 and
dI(t)
dt |t=0 < CN . Also, from the above equations, we get that
Nl(t) +Ni(t) = I(t).
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The evolution exits Stage 1 when any one of the following
conditions is attained,
C1 : dI
dt
(t)−
dNi
dt
≥ CN + βNl(t), (87)
C2 : dI
dt
(t) ≤ ρNl(t) + κNi(t). (88)
Here, C1 occurs when the number of wanters approaching
the legitimate CDN exceeds its current capacity, Then, from
(83), the dynamics of evolution of Nl(t) changes. C2 happens
when the number of users attempting to download from the
illicit P2P reduces below the current capacity of the illicit P2P.
Then, from (82), the dynamics of evolution of Ni(t) changes.
Next, we show if κ < 1− 2√
lnN
, C1 occurs before C2 and the
evolution proceeds to Stage 2. Otherwise, Stage 1 is followed
by Stage 7.
Now, let T2, be the time at which C1 is attained, i.e,
dI(t)
dt
|t=T2 −
dNi(t)
dt
|t=T2 = CN + βNl(T2),(89)
⇒
dI(t)
dt
|t=T2 − κI(T2) = CN (90)
⇒ I(T2) =
N(1− κ)
2
[
1−
√
1−
4
lnN(1− κ)2
]
(91)
The second equality follows from (84) along with the facts that
κ = ρ + β and Nl(t) + Ni(t) = I(t). Equation (91) follows
from the definition of I(t). In the above equation, T2 has a
real positive solution iff κ < 1 − 2√
lnN
. Also, let T7 be the
time at which C2 is attained, i.e,
dI(t)
dt |t=T7 = ρNl(T7) + κNi(T7)
⇒ dI(t)dt |t=T7 − κI(T7) = −βNl(T7). (92)
The second equality follows from the facts that κ = ρ + β
and Nl(t) +Ni(t) = I(t). From (90), (92) and the definition
of I(t), it can be shown that, if T2 has a real valued solution,
then T2 < T7. Therefore, Stage 1 is followed by Stage 2 if
κ < 1− 2√
lnN
and, Stage 7 otherwise.
Stage 2 : The evolution enters Stage 2 from Stage 1 due to
the condition C1 given by (87). Then, the dynamics of Ni(t)
does not change from that of Stage 1,
dNi
dt
= ρNl(t) + κNi(t), (93)
but the dynamics of Nl(t) changes to,
dNl
dt
= CN + βNl(t). (94)
Also, from the above equations and (87), Nl(t)+Ni(t) ≤ I(t).
A transition from this stage occurs when any one of the
following conditions is satisfied,
C3 : CN + βNl(t) ≥
dI(t)
dt
−
dNi(t)
dt
,
Nw(t) = 0, (95)
C4 : dI(t)
dt
+Nw(t) ≤ ρNl(t) + κNi(t). (96)
Here, C3 occurs when the number of wanters in the system
goes to zero and the rate at which newly generated popula-
tion approaching the legitimate CDN falls below its current
capacity. Then, from (83), the dynamics of evolution of Nl(t)
changes. C2 happens when the number of users attempting
to download from the illicit P2P reduces below the current
capacity of the illicit P2P. Then, from (82), the dynamics of
evolution of Ni(t) changes. The evolution enters Stage 3, if
C3 is attained before C4. Otherwise, it proceeds to Stage 4.
Let T3 mark the time at which the evolution enters Stage 3.
Then, from C3 and (93),
CN + βNl(T3) ≥
dI(t)
dt
|t=T3 − (ρNi(T3) + κNl(T3)), (97)
and Nw(T3) = 0. (98)
Also, let Stage 4 start at time t = T4. Then, from C4,
dI(t)
dt
|t=T4 +Nw(T4) = ρNl(T4) + κNi(T4). (99)
Stage 3: The evolution enters Stage 3 from Stage 2 due
to the condition C3 given by (95). Then, the dynamics Ni(t)
does not change from that of Stage 2,
dNi(t)
dt
= ρNl(t) + κNi(t), (100)
but, the evolution of Nl(t) changes to,
dNl(t)
dt
=
dI(t)
dt
−
dNi(t)
dt
, (101)
=
dI(t)
dt
− (ρNl(t) + κNi(t)). (102)
This stage starts at t = T3, which is defined by (97) and
(98). From the above dynamics equations and (98), we get
Nl(t) +Ni(t) = I(t).
We show that the evolution of Nl(t), given by (101), does
not change as long as the evolution of Ni(t) does not deviate
from (100). This claim holds true if
CN + βNl(t) ≥
dI(t)
dt
− (ρNl(t) + κNi(t)),
⇒
dI(t)
dt
− κI(t) ≤ CN , (103)
for all t ≥ T3. The second inequality follows from the facts
κ = ρ + β and Nl(t) + Ni(t) = I(t). At t = T3 the above
requirement is met, which follows from (97). Then, we get
I(T3) ≥
N(1− κ)
2
, (104)
from the definition of I(t) and (103). The function dI(t)dt −
κI(t) is monotonically decreasing if I(t) > N(1−κ)2 . Then,
(103) holds for all t > T3 and that proves our claim.
The above discussion implies that a transition from this
stage happens only when the dynamics of evolution of Ni(t)
changes. From (82) and (100), the dynamics of Ni(t) changes,
when the number of users downloading from the illicit P2P
reduces below the current capacity of illicit P2P,
C5 : dI(t)
dt
≤ ρNl(t) + κNi(t). (105)
When C5 occurs, evolution enters Stage 5. Let this occurs at
t = T5. Then,
dI(t)
dt
|t=T5 = ρNl(T5) + κNi(T5). (106)
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Stage 4: The evolution enters Stage 3 from Stage 2 due to
the condition C4 given by (96). Then, the dynamics of Nl(t)
does not change from that of Stage 2,
dNl(t)
dt
= CN + βNl(t), (107)
but the evolution of Ni(t) changes to,
dNi(t)
dt
= Nw(t) +
dI(t)
dt
, (108)
This stage starts at time t = T4 defined by (99).
We claim that the evolution of Ni(t) follows (108) for all
t ≥ T4. This claim holds true if(
Nw(t) +
dI(t)
dt
)
≤ ρNl(t) + κNi(t), (109)
for all t ≥ T4. Note that Equation (109) holds true at t = T4.
Since, Nw(t) = I(t) − (Nl(t) + Ni(t)) by definition, from
Equation (108), we get that dNw(t)dt < 0. Also, using the
definition of Nw(t) in (99), we can show that
dI(t)
dt
|t=T4 − κI(T4) = −(1 + κ)Nw(T4)− βNl(T4) < 0.
Then, from the definition of I(t), the above result holds for
all t ≥ T4. Then, we get
d
dt
(
Nw(t) +
dI
dt
)
<
d
dt
(ρNl(t) + κNi(t)),
which along with (99) proves (109).
The above discussion implies that a transition from this
stage occurs when the evolution of Nl(t) changes. From (107)
and (83), the evolution of Nl(t) changes when the number of
wanters goes to zero. Then,
Nw(T6) = 0. (110)
where T6 marks the beginning of Stage 6.
Stage 5,6,7:
These are the final stages of evolution. Stage 5 is preceded
by Stage 3, Stage 6 is preceded by Stage 4, and Stage 7 is
preceded by Stage 1. The dynamics of all these stages are
identical,
dNl(t)
dt
= 0, (111)
dNi(t)
dt
=
dI(t)
dt
. (112)
It is easy to see that the evolutions of Nl(t) and Nl(t) stay in
these stages forever once they reach here.
In summary, if κ ≥ 1 − 2√
lnN
, the evolution
of Ni(t) and Nl(t) traverse along the sequence
of phases, Stage 1 →Stage 7. Otherwise, they
proceed along the sequence of phases, Stage 1 →
Stage 2 →Stage 3(Stage 4) →Stage 5(Stage 6). In the
next section, we analyze these two cases separately and
obtain a lower bound on number of legal copies of the
content in the system at the end of evolution.
A. Analysis
We first consider the case, κ ≥ 1− 2√
lnN
. Let us introduce
a few notation before stating the result. We define
Φ(x) =
(
I(0)
N
)β
N
[
(1− κ)ψ
(
β,
x
N
)
− κψ
(
β − 1,
x
N
)]
,
(113)
and ψ(β, x) =
∫ x
I(0)/N
(
1−u
u
)β
du. Also, let
T¯ = ln
[
N(1− κ)G
I(0) (2− (1− κ)G)
]
, (114)
where G = 1 +
√
1 + 4βDN(1−κ)2 and D = Φ(N(1 −
κ))
(
N(1−κ)
I(0)κ
)β
. Now, we are ready to provide the result.
Lemma 13. Assume κ ≥ 1 − 2√
lnN
. Then, a lower bound
on the number of legal copies of the content in the system at
t = T∞ is given by,
Nl(T∞) ≥ (Φ(I(T¯ )) + I(0))eβT¯ . (115)
where I(t) is given by (3).
Proof: Recall that, when κ ≥ 1 − 2√
lnN
, the evolution
of Nl(t) and Ni(t) takes place in two stages, namely Stage 1
and Stage 7. Solving the dynamics of evolution in Stage 1,
given by (85) and (84), we get
Nl(t) = (Φ(I(t))− Φ(I(0))e
βt + I(0)eβt,
= (Φ(I(t)) + I(0))eβt, (116)
where Φ(x) is defined by (113). The second equality follows
since Φ(I(0)) = 0.
Stage 7 starts at t = T7. Recall from (92) that T7 is a
solution to the equation,
dI(t)
dt
− κI(t) = −βNl(t)
. It is not easy to solve the above equation exactly . Hence,
here, we obtain a lower bound on T7. Let r = ln(N(1−κ)I(0)κ ).
Note that, at t = r,
dI
dt
(t)− κI(t) = 0.
Also, the function dIdt (t) − κI(t) is positive for t < r and, it
is monotonically decreasing for t ≥ r. Then, r ≤ T7. Then,
Nl(r) ≤ Nl(T7). That implies the solution of the equation,
dI
dt
− κI(t) = −βNl(r),
must be less than or equal to T7. Now, substituting Nl(r) from
Equation (116) in the above equation, and then, solving for t
yields T¯ , which is defined by (114), as the unique solution.
Since no legals are generated in Stage 7 according to (111),
and T7 ≥ T¯ , we have
Nl(T∞) = Nl(T7) ≥ Nl(T¯ ).
Now, obtain Nl(T¯ ) from (116) and substitute in the above
inequality to prove the lemma.
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Now, we consider the second case where κ < 1 − 2√
lnN
.
We introduce a few notation before stating the result. Let
I2 =
N(1−κ)
2
[
1−
√
1− 4lnN(1−κ)2
]
, (117)
T2 = ln
[
NI2
I(0)(N−I2)
]
, (118)
I3 =
I2e
∆T1
1− I2
N
+
I2
N
e∆T1
, (119)
∆T1 =
1
κ ln
[
c
κ
+N(1−κ)2 [1+H]
c
κ
+
N(1−κ)
2 [1−H]
]
, (120)
∆T2 =
1
κ ln
[
c
κ
+I3
c
κ
+I2
]
, (121)
T¯3 = T2 +∆T2 (122)
L3 =
C
β (e
β∆T2 − 1) + (Φ(I2) + I(0))e
βT¯3 ,
where H =
√
1− 4lnN(1−κ)2 .
Also, let
I4 = I(T¯3) =
I(0)eT¯3
1− I(0)
N
+ I(0)
N
eT¯3
, (123)
I5 =
N(1−κ)
2
[
1 +
√
1 + 4βL3N(1−κ)2
]
, (124)
T¯5 = ln
[
NI5
I(0)(N−I5)
]
, (125)
L4 = (Φ(I5)− Φ(I4))e
βT¯5 + L3e
β(T¯5−T¯3),
where I(t) is the Bass demand function.
Lemma 14. Assume κ < 1− 2√
lnN
. Then, a lower bound on
the number of legals at t = T∞ is given by,
Nl(T∞) ≥
{
L3 if T¯5 ≤ T¯3
L4, else.
(126)
Proof: When κ < 1− 2√
lnN
, the evolution of of Nl(t) and
Ni(t) takes place along a sequence of stages, which is given
by, ‘Stage 1 → Stage 2 →Stage 3(or Stage 4)→Stage 5(or
Stage 6)’. An exact characterization of Nl(t) and Ni(t)
might be quite difficult as the analysis involves solving many
complex differential equations. Therefore, we define two pro-
cesses N¯l(t) and N¯i(t); N¯l(t) bounds Nl(t) from below and
N¯i(t) bounds Ni(t) from above. We analyze these bounding
processes instead of the actual processes.
We go through a sequence of intermediate steps to prove
this lemma.
Step 1: Define N¯l(t) and N¯i(t)
First of all, let N¯l(0) = Nl(0) and N¯i(0) = Ni(0). Let
N¯l(t) evolves as follows,
dN¯l(t)
dt
=


dI
dt − (ρN¯l(t) + κN¯i(t)), [0, T2],
CN + βN¯l(t), [T2, T¯3],
dI
dt − (ρN¯l(t) + κN¯i(t)), [T¯3,max{T¯3, T¯5}],
0, [max{T¯3, T¯5}, T∞].
(127)
Also, let
dN¯i(t)
dt
=


(ρN¯l(t) + κN¯i(t)), [0, T2],
(ρN¯l(t) + κN¯i(t))
+Rδ(t− T¯3), [T2, T¯3],
(ρN¯l(t) + κN¯i(t)), (T¯3,max{T¯3, T¯5}],
dI
dt [max{T¯3, T¯5}, T∞].
(128)
where T2 is given by (118), T¯3 is defined by (122), T¯5 is
defined by (125), R = I(T¯3) − (Nl(T¯3) + Ni(T¯3)) and δ(t)
is Kronecker delta function. It can be verified that T¯3 > T2.
Also, the following equations can be verified:
dI(t)
dt
∣∣
t=T¯3 − κI(T¯3) ≤ CN , (129)
N¯l(t) + N¯i(t) < I(t)for T2 < t < T¯3, (130)
dI(t)
dt
∣∣
t=T¯5 − κI(T¯5) = βN¯l(T¯3). (131)
Also, we define N¯w(t) = I(t)− (N¯l(t) + N¯i(t)). In the next
step, we show that N¯l(t) ≤ Nl(t) for all t.
Step 2: We claim that N¯l(t) ≤ Nl(t):
Recall that, the actual processes may pass through either
Stages 3 and 5 or Stages 4 and 6. We analyze these two cases
separately.
Case 1: The evolution of Nl(t) and Ni(t) takes place along
Stages 3 and 5
First of all, we have Nl(0) = N¯l(0) and Ni(0) = N¯i(0)
from the definition of the bounding processes. Now, suppose
T¯3 ≤ T3. Then, comparing Stage 1 dynamics, (85, 84), and
Stage 2 dynamics (94, 93) with the bounding process dynamics
(127, 128), we get that, for t ∈ [0, T¯3],
dN¯l(t)
dt
=
dNl(t)
dt
and dN¯i(t)
dt
≥
dNi(t)
dt
.
Then,
N¯l(t) = Nl(t) if t ∈ [0, T¯3]. (132)
Also, suppose T¯5 ≤ T5. Then, comparing Stage 2 dynamics,
(94, 93), Stage 3 dynamics (101, 100) and Stage 5 dynamics
(111, 112) with the bounding process dynamics (127, 128),
we get that, for t ∈ [T¯3, T∞],
dN¯l(t)
dt
≤
dNl(t)
dt
and dN¯i(t)
dt
≥
dNi(t)
dt
.
Then, N¯l(t) ≤ Nl(t) for t > T¯3. To complete the proof, we
must show that T¯3 ≤ T3 and T¯5 ≤ T5.
Show that T¯3 ≤ T3: Recall that Stage 3 begins at T3 in the
evolution of the original processes. From the definition of T3,
given by (97),
dI(t)
dt |t=T3 − (ρNl(T3) + κNi(T3)) ≤ CN + βNl(T3),
⇒ dI(t)dt |t=T3 − κI(T3) ≤ CN . (133)
The second inequality follows from the facts that κ = ρ+ β
and Ni(T3)+Nl(T3) = I(T3) (since Nw(T3) = 0 from (98)).
First, we guess a lower bound for T3. Suppose, at time
t = r,
I(r) =
N(1− κ)
2
[
1 +
√
1 +
4
lnN(1− κ)2
]
,
is satisfied. Note that I(r) > I(T2) and hence, r > T2. It can
be shown that if t ∈ [T2, r],
dI
dt
(t)− κI(t) ≥ CN ,
with equality at t = T2 and t = r. Also, the function, dIdt (t)−
κI(t) strictly decreasing if t ≥ r. Then, from (133) and the
fact that T3 > T2, we conclude that r ≤ T3.
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Now, obtain a better lower bound for T3. Let us define
U(t) = Nl(t)+Ni(t). From (98), we have Nw(T3) = 0, which
implies that U(T3) = I(T3). We know that U(r) ≤ I(r). Find
t′ such that U(t′) = I(r). Then, U(t′) ≤ I(t′). Then, get s
such that U(s) = I(t′). Since U(t) and I(t) are monotonically
increasing, we have r ≤ t′ ≤ s ≤ T3.
From the dynamics of evolution of Stage 2, given by (93)
and (94), we can show that during the interval [T2, T3],
U(t) =
(
C
κ
+ I2
)
eκ(t−T2) −
C
κ
.
Then, it can be shown that t′ = T2 + ∆T1, I3 = I(t′) and
s = T¯3. Hence, T¯3 ≤ T3.
Show that T¯5 ≤ T5: Recall that Stage 5 begins at T5. From
(106),
dI(t)
dt
|t=T5 − κI(T5) = −βNl(T5).
The above result is due to the facts that κ = ρ+β and Ni(t)+
Nl(t) = I(t) in Stage 3 and 5.
We guess a lower bound for T5. From, (131),
dI(t)
dt
∣∣
t=T¯5 − κI(T¯5) = −βN¯l(T¯3).
is satisfied. If T¯5 ≤ T¯3, then T¯5 ≤ T3 ≤ T5. Suppose T¯5 > T¯3.
Recall that T¯3 ≤ T3 ≤ T5 and N¯l(T¯3) = Nl(T¯3) (from (132)).
Then, N¯l(T¯3) ≤ Nl(T5). Also, dI(t)dt − κI(t) is a decreasing
function of t when its value is negative. Combining these facts
with the definitions of T5 and T¯5, we can assert that T¯5 ≤ T5.
Case 2: The evolution of Nl(t) and Ni(t) takes place along
Stage 4 and Stage 6.
We have to consider two cases, T4 < T¯3 and T4 ≥ T¯3
respectively.
Suppose T4 < T¯3: First, we show that,
N¯l(T¯3) = Nl(T¯3). (134)
Note that the dynamics of actual and the bounding processes
are identical untill t = T4. Then, Nw(T4) = N¯w(T4). Also,
during T4 < t ≤ min{T6, T¯3}, N¯i(t) grows faster than
Ni(t), while N¯l(t) grows at the same rate as that of Nl(t).
Therefore, to prove (134) holds true, we just need to show
that T6 ≥ T¯3, which is done as follows: Note that, when
t ∈ [T4,min{T6, T¯3}], the growth rate of Nl(t)+Ni(t) is less
than that of N¯l(t) + N¯i(t), and hence N¯w(t) ≤ Nw(t). Then,
from (130) and the definition of N¯w(t), we get Nw(t) > 0
when T4 < t < T¯3 (since T4 > T2 by definition). Then, from
(110), we get that T6 cannot be less than T¯3.
Now, suppose T¯5 ≤ T¯3. Then, from (134) and (127),
N¯l(T∞) = N¯l(T¯3) = Nl(T¯3) ≤ N(T∞),
which proves our claim. Now, we show that T¯5 ≤ T¯3 as
follows: For all t > T4, (109) is satisfied. Then, we get
dI(t)
dt
∣∣
t=T¯3 − κI(T¯3) ≤ −βNl(T¯3).
due to the assumption, T4 < T¯3 and the definition of Nw(t).
But, from (131) and (134),
dI(t)
dt
∣∣
t=T¯5 − κI(T¯5) = −βNl(T¯3).
Therefore, T¯5 ≤ T¯3 since dIdt − κI(t) is decreasing in t once
it goes negative.
Suppose T4 ≥ T¯3: Note that the dynamics of actual and the
bounding processes are identical untill t = T¯3. To prove the
claim, we show that
dNl(t)
dt
≥
dN¯l(t)
dt
when t ≥ T¯3. (135)
At t = T¯3, from (129), the dynamics of actual and the
bounding processes, the above expression holds true. Also,
during t ∈ [T¯3, T6], dNl(t)dt and
dN¯l(t)
dt are increasing and
decreasing functions respectively. Hence, (135) holds true until
t ≤ T6. Now, we show that T¯5 < T6, and hence the growth rate
of N¯l(t) is zero for t ≥ T6. This asserts that (135) holds for
t ≥ T6. The proof is as follows: From (99) and the definition
of Nw(t), we get
dI(t)
dt
|t=T4 − κI(T4) = −βNl(T4)− (1 + κ)Nw(T4). (136)
Then, T¯5 ≤ T4 due to these reasons: 1) T¯5 satisfies (131),
2) βN¯l(T¯3) = βNl(T¯3 < βNl(T4) + (1 + κ)Nw(T4) since
T¯3 < T4 by assumption, 3) dI(t)dt − κI(t) is decreasing once
its value goes negative. Now, since T4 < T6, we have T¯5 < T6,
and hence (135) is attained.
Having shown that N¯l(t) bounds Nl(t) from below, we
evaluate N¯l(T∞) in the next step.
Step 5: Evaluate the bounding process, N¯l(T∞):
Find N¯l(T2): The evolution of the bounding processes
during [0, T2] are given by (127) and (128). Solving them,
we get
N¯l(t) = (Φ(I(t))− Φ(I(0))e
βt + I(0)eβt,
= (Φ(I(t)) + I(0))eβt,
where Φ(x) is defined by (113). The second equality holds
true since Φ(I(0)) = 0.
Substituting T2 from (118) in the above result,
N¯l(T2) = (Φ(I2) + I(0))e
βT2 ,
where I2 = I(T2).
Find N¯l(T¯3): Solving the growth equations given by (127)
and (128), for the interval [T2, T¯3], we get
N¯l(t) =
(
C
β
+ N¯l(T2)
)
eβ(t−T2) −
C
β
.
Substituting, T¯3 from (122), and N¯l(T2) in the above
expression, we get
Nl(T¯3) =
C
β
(eβ∆T2 − 1) + (Φ(I2) + I(0))e
βT¯3 = L3.
where L3 is given by (123).
Let T¯3 < T¯5. Find N¯l(T¯5): Solving the growth equations
given by (127) and (128), for the interval [T¯3, T¯5], we get
N¯l(t) = (Φ(I(t)) − Φ(I(T¯3))e
βt + N¯l(T¯3)e
β(t−T¯3),
Substituting T¯3, T¯5 and N¯l(T¯3) in the above equation, we
get
N¯l(t) = (Φ(I5)− Φ(I4))e
βt + L3e
β(T¯5−T¯3) = L4,
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where I5, I4, L3 and L4 are given by (124), (123), (123) and
(126) respectively.
Find N¯l(T∞): From (127), we have dN¯l(t)dt = 0,
for t ≥ max{T¯3, T¯5}. Therefore, we have N¯l(T∞) =
N¯l(max{T¯3, T¯5}). Then,
Nl(T∞) ≥ N¯l(T∞) =
{
N¯l(T¯3) = L3 if T¯5 ≤ T¯3
N¯l(T¯5) = L4, else.
We have characterized the number of legal copies generated
in the system in the presence of an efficient illicit P2P in the
previous two lemmas. Attaining the statement in Theorem 3
is accomplished by studying the asymptotics of the results in
Lemma 13 and 14. We start by introducing a few notation.
∆T3 =
1
κ
ln [κ(1− κ) lnN + (1− κ)] ,
T˜3 = T2 +∆T3, (137)
∆T4 =
1
κ
ln
[
κ(1 − κ)
1 + κ
lnN + (1− κ)
]
, (138)
T˜4 = T2 +∆T4. (139)
Also, we say, AN ∼ BN , if limN→∞ ANBN = 1, AN  BN ,
if limN→∞ ANBN ≤ 1. and, AN  BN , if limN→∞
AN
BN
≥ 1.
Now, we are ready to prove the theorem.
As N goes large, for any given κ, the assumption of
Lemma 14 that κ < 1 − 2√
lnN
is attained. Therefore, in the
asymptotic case, we use the result of Lemma 14. That lemma
says,
Nl(T∞) ≥
{
L3, if T¯5 ≤ T¯3
L4, else.
(140)
where T¯3, L3, T¯5 and L4 are given by (122), (123), (125) and
(126) respectively. The proof is done in two steps. First, we
evaluate L3. Next, we show that T¯3  T¯5. Then, from the
above equation, we get that Nl(T∞)  L3.
Evaluate L3: As N goes larger, it can be shown that,
I2 ∼
N
lnN(1− κ)
, ∆T2 ∼
1
κ
ln (κ(1− κ) logN) ,
T2 ∼ ln
(
N
I(0)(1− κ) lnN
)
,
T¯3 ∼ ln
[
N(κ(1− κ) lnN)
1
κ
I(0)(1− κ) lnN
]
.
Φ(I2) ∼
(
I(0)
N
)β
N
(1− κ)
(1 − β)
(
1
(1 − κ) lnN
)1−β
.
The above results follows from (117), (121), (118), (122) and
(113) respectively. Substituting the above results in (123), we
get that
L3 ∼
N
lnNβ
(
(lnNκ(1− κ))
β
κ
(1− β)
− 1
)
. (141)
Show that T¯3  T¯5: First of all, from (125) and (124), note
that, I(T¯5) = I5 and I5 ≤ N . Also, for large values of N , from
(122) and the definition of I(t), we can show that, I(T¯3) ∼ N .
Combining these two results, we get I(T¯5)  I(T¯3) This result
in turn implies that T¯5  T¯3, since I(t) is monotonically
increasing.
Hence, from (140),
Nl(T∞)  L3.
From (141), the above equation, and (10), we get (16), which
completes the first part of theorem.
The second part of the theorem deals with the case β = 0.
From, (16), we have,
L ∈ Ω
(
ln lnN
lnN
)
. (142)
Now, to complete the proof, it suffices to prove the following
lemma.
Lemma 15. When β = 0,
L ∈ o
(
ln lnN
lnN
)
.
Proof: Recall that when κ < 1 − 2√
lnN
, which holds
for any κ when N is large, the evolution of Nl(t) and
Ni(t) takes place along the sequence of phases,‘Stage 1 →
Stage 2 →Stage 3 ( or Stage 4)→Stage 5 ( or Stage 6)’. We
analyze each of these phases and obtain an upper bound on
Nl(T∞) as follows.
Stage 1: An upper bound on the number of legal copies at
the end of this stage is given by,
Nl(T2) 
N
lnN(1− κ)
. (143)
which follows from the facts that Nl(t) ≤ I(t) for all t and
I(T2) ∼
N
lnN(1−κ) . Stage 2: First we show that as N goes
large, T4  T3 and hence, in the asymptotic case Stage 2
is followed by Stage 4. The proof of this claim proceeds as
follows. Let, U(t) = Nl(t) + Ni(t). From the dynamics of
evolution of Stage 2, given by (93) and (94),
U(t) =
(
C
κ
+ I2
)
eκ(t−T2) −
C
κ
, (144)
where I2 is given (117) and T2 is given by (118). Now,
substituting T˜3 from (137) in the above equation, we get
U(T˜3) ∼ I(T˜3).
Also, it is easy to verify that T¯3 satisfies (97). These results
along with the definition of T3, given by (97-98), implies that
T˜3 ∼ T3. Similarly, substituting T˜4 in (144), we can show that
U(T˜4) ∼
1
1 + κ
(
I(T˜4) +
dI
dt
(T˜4)
)
.
This result along with the definition of T4, given by (99),
implies that T˜4 ∼ T4.
We have, T˜4  T˜3, since
U(T˜4) =
N
1 + κ
< N = U(T˜3),
and U(t) is monotonically increasing. Therefore, we conclude
that T4  T3. And hence, this stage is always followed by
Stage 4.
Then, from the dynamics of Nl(t), given by (94),
Nl(T4) = Nl(T2) + CN (T4 − T2).
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Now, from (143) and the definitions of T˜4 and T2, we get
Nl(T4) 
N
lnN(1− κ)
+
N
κ lnN
ln
(
lnN
κ(1− κ)
1 + κ
+ 1− κ
)
.
(145)
Stage 4: This stage starts at time t = T4. From the
discussion given above (in Stage 3 analysis), T4 ∼ T˜4. Then,
from (139), I(T4) ∼ I(T˜4) ∼ N and dIdt (T4) ∼ dIdt (T˜4) ∼ 0.
Also, Nw(T4) = I(T˜4) − U(T˜4) ∼ Nκ1+κ . Recall that U(t) =
Nl(t) +Ni(t). And U(T˜4) is obtained from (144) and (139).
Using these facts and the dynamics of Ni(t) and Nl(t) given
by (108) and (107) respectively, we show that,
U(t) = (CN +N)(1− e
−t) + U(T˜4)e−(t−T˜4).
This stage terminates, when no Wanters are left to be served,
i.e U(t) ∼ N . Let T˜6 marks this event. Then,
T˜6 ∼ ln
(
lnN
1 + κ
)
.
The legal copies of content generated in this phase is CN ×
(T˜6 − T˜4) from the dynamics of Nl(t) given by (107). Then,
from the above result and (145), we get
Nl(T∞) 
N
lnN
ln
[
(lnN)(
1
κ
+1)
1 + κ
(
(1 − κ)κ
(1 + κ)
) 1
κ
]
,
which completes the proof.
APPENDIX E
TECHNICAL LEMMAS
Lemma 16. Consider a differential equation given
dy
dt
= CN +
βy
N
(I − U(t)) (146)
where
U(t) =
Nθ2
κ
+
N∆θ/κ
1 + be−∆θ(t−T )
.
Then for all t−T > ln b∆θ , the solution to the above differential
equation satisfies the inequality
y(t) ≥ y(T )
(
1+b
d
) β
κ e(−q1(t−T ))
+CN
(
b
d
) β
κ e(−q1(t−T ))
(
e(q1
ln b
∆θ )
q1
− 1q1
)
1b≥1
+CN
(
1
d
) β
κ e(−q1(t−T ))
(
e(q2∆τj)
q2
− e
(q2 ln b∆θ )
q2
1b≥1
)
−CN
(
1
d
) β
κ e(−q1(t−T )) 1q2 (1− 1b≥1), (147)
where d = (b + exp(∆θ(t − T ))), q1 =
(
βθ2
κ −
βI
N
)
and
q2 =
βθ1
κ −
βI
N . Furthermore, for β = 0, equality holds.
Proof: A general solution to the above differential equa-
tion is
y(t) =
∫
CN exp(
∫
Pdt) +M∫
Pdt
(148)
where P (t) = − βN (I − U(t)). We have∫
Pdt = −
βIt
N
+
βθ2t
κ
+
β
κ
ln (1 + (1/b) exp(∆θ(t − T ))) .
Then,
CNe
∫
Pdt = CNB(t) exp
(
βθ2
κ
−
βIt
N
)
t,
where
B(t) = (1 + (1/b) exp(∆θ(t− T )))
β
κ .
For b ≥ 1, we can lower bound B(t) as
B(t) ≥
{
1 t ≤ ln b∆θ + T(
1
b
) β
κ exp
(
β
κ∆θ(t− T )
)
t > ln b∆θ + T.
(149)
On the other hand, if b < 1,
B(t) ≥
(
1
b
) β
κ
exp
(
β
κ
∆θ(t− T )
)
, ∀t. (150)
Let us now evaluate A(t). We have
A(t) =
∫
CNe
∫
Pdtdt.
Initially consider the case b ≥ 1. For t < ln b∆θ + T , it is easy
to verify that
A(t) ≥ CN
exp
((
βθ2
κ −
βI
N
)
t
)
βθ2
κ −
βI
N
(151)
where the inequality follows from (149). For t > ln b∆θ +T , we
have
A(t) ≥ A(
ln b
∆θ
+ T ) +
∫ t
ln b
∆θ+T
CNe
∫
Pdt (152)
≥ CN exp (q1T ) exp
(
q1
ln b
∆θ
)
1
q1
+ CN exp (q1t)
(
1
b
) β
κ exp
(
β∆θ
κ (t− T )
)
q2
− CN exp (q1T )
(
1
b
) β
κ exp
(
q2
ln b
∆θ
)
q2
.
where q1 =
(
βθ2
κ −
βI
N
)
and q2 = βθ1κ −
βI
N .
In the second case, in which b < 1, for all values of t, we
have,
A(t) ≥ CN exp (q1t)
(
1
b
) β
κ exp
(
β∆θ
κ (t− T )
)
q2
.
where the inequality follows from (150).
Then, combining the expressions of A(t) in both cases, for
t > ln b∆θ + T , we have,
A(t) ≥ CN exp (q1T ) exp
(
q1
ln b
∆θ
)
1
q1
1b≥1 (153)
+ CN exp (q1t)
(
1
b
) β
κ exp
(
β∆θ
κ (t− T )
)
q2
− CN exp (q1T )
(
1
b
) β
κ exp
(
q2
ln b
∆θ
)
q2
1b≥1.
where 1b≥1 is the indicator function defined by (51).
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Using the above result in equation (148), we get that for
t > ln b∆θ + T ,
y(t) =
M
exp(
∫
Pdt)
+
A(t)
exp(
∫
Pdt)
(154)
≥M
(
b
d
) β
κ
exp (−q1t)
+ CN
(
b
d
) β
κ
exp (−q1(t− T )) exp
(
q1
ln b
∆θ
)
1
q1
1b≥1
+ CN
(
1
d
) β
κ exp
(
β∆θ
κ (t− T )
)
q2
− CN
(
1
d
) β
κ
exp (−q1(t− T ))
exp
(
q2
ln b
∆θ
)
q2
1b≥1.
(155)
where d = (b+ exp(∆θ(t− T ))).
Using boundary conditions, we can show that
M =
(
1 + b
b
) β
κ
exp (q1T )
(
y(T )− CN
(
b
1 + b
) β
κ 1
q1
1b≥1
)
−
(
1 + b
b
) β
κ
(
CN
(
1
1 + b
) β
κ 1
q2
(1 − 1b≥1)
)
.
Substituting the above equation in equation (155) and rearrang-
ing yields (147). For β = 0, the inequalities in equations (149)
and (150) become equalities and we get the lemma.
